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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated 78A-4-103(2)G), as this case was poured over from the Utah
Supreme Court See Utah Code Annotated 78A-2-3G)-

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the city to refuse to provide
names of employees who may be personally liable regarding a claim under the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), both prior to the filing of notice of

VJ

claim and then·. before the suit is filed, and then hold the notice of claim and suit
were deficient because they failed to timely name the individual employees whose
names the City had refused to disclose.
Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,

221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
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Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R.512-532).
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in allowing the city to agree to an amended
notice of claim and later repudiate the agreement by holding such amended notice
of claim is not allowed. The claim had been properly commenced under the GIA
by properly serving a notice of claim on the City Clerk, who then gave the case to
the city attorney to resolve. The city attorney agreed to amend the notice of claim
to remedy the city's refusal to give employee names to include on it.
Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, wliich is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
221 P.3d 219; 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R.512-532).
3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred by not estopping the tjty from being bound
by its written claim form which informed claimants the deemed denied period was
90 days. Apparently with knowledge of the error, the city misinformed claimants
in writing for over 8 years on their official notice of claim form given to potential
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claimants, in both the instruction letter as well as in capital letters on the first line
of the claim form itself, that the City had 90 days in which to respond to a claim
or it is deemed denied which raises the question of how far can a city go to
obstruct, misinform or confuse claimants?
Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R.512-532).
4. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not estopping the city from conduct where
"the citizen has a right to expect the same standard ofhone~ty, justice and fair
dealing in his contact with the state or other political entity, which he is legally
accorded in his dealing with other individuals" found in Rice v. Granite School
Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 161 and if citizens still expect interactions with governmental
entities to follow this standard set out in Rice in 1969?
Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
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Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R..512532) ..
5. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not requiring the city to "strictly comply"
with the GIA rather than just "substantially comply" thus allowing the city to
introduce significant confusion to claimants attempting to comply with the GIA.
Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah~- Co.,
221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R..512-532).
6. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in requiring the Plaintiffs to include "specific
allegations" of "malice or fraud" in the notice of claim fonn against individual
employees where the GIA only requires the names of the employees. Further, the
GIA allows Plaintiffs to show willful misconduct rather than "malice and fraud"
when employees are alleged to have acted outside the scope of their employment.
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Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness·. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R.512-532);
VIP

Affidavit (R. 424-430); First Amended Complaint (R. 315-328).
7. Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it held the city's actions immune from
suit because the city used the term 'flood waters' with no further evidence of such.
Does a City's failure to maintain a waterway over time which then causes bank
erosion does allow them to claim a 'flood emergency', ignore State and federal law
by going into the stream, alter the stream bank, excavate the b~ks and stream
bed, and take other action, all under the guise of management of flood waters?
Standard of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).
Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
·Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
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Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) .and Trial Court Ruling (R..512-532);
Affidavit (R. 424-430); First Amended Complaint (R. 315-328).

8. Issue: Whether the trial court erred when the complaint against Child and Riding
was dismissed on the basis the notice of claim and amended notice of claim were
insufficient and should have include them.

Standard,of review: A district court's decision to grant Summary Judgment
presents an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co.,
221 P.3d 219, 2009 UT 61 (Utah 2009).

Preservation: Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits (354-376, 377-423);
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment and Exhibits (R. 431-455, 456-473) and Trial Court Ruling (R.512-532);
Affidavit (R. 424-430); First Amended Complaint (R. 315-328).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION

Plaintiffs/Appellants Wade and Sandra Winegar (''Winegars") filed a Notice
of Claim form pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA") (U.C.
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A. 63G-7-et. seq.) with Springville City on January 27,.2006 for damage done to
their property in May of 2005 by Defendants/Appellees, Springville City Corp (the
City), Bill Child and Jason Riding (Child and Riding) (R. 377-423). The City
refused to disclose the names of individual employees involved in cutting trees,
damaging the stream and bank, even after the Notice of Claim form had been
served so Winegars amended the Notice of Claim form on April 24, 2006 pursuant
VJ

to an agreement with the City attorney (R. 377-423). On April 25, 2007, Winegars
filed an action against -the City and :John Does 1-20' (R. l-11). Nearly four years
later on April 14, 2011, the City filed a motion for summary judgment which was
initially granted on June 7, 2011 (R. 62-62, 95-99). Tlris case was initially appealed
on July 5, 2011. The Utah Court of Appeals moved, sua sponte, for Summary
Disposition to dismiss. the case without prejudice because it believed the order
prepared by Defendants from the trial court wa~. n<:>t a final order. After briefing
arguments on this issue, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Per Curiam Decision
on October 6, 2011 which dismissed the case without prejudice stating the Fourth
District Court Order was not a final, appealable order. The Court of Appeals
then transferred the case back to the trial court for the Defendant to submit a
proper Final Order for signature. The City later submitted a final order which was
signed by the trial court on September 20, 2012 (R. 125-130).
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This order was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals which latter issued an
opinion and remanded the case to the trial court on January 16, 2014. The City
finally disclosed the names of the two individuals involved, Child and Riding, and
Winegars moved to amend the complaint to add them which motion was granted
and the complaint amended. The City then filed another motion for summary
judgment as to all parties (R. 351-353) claiming Winegars failed to timely meet the
requirements of the GIA, failed to include necessary-information in the notice of
claim, failed to timely identify Jason Riding and Bill Child, failed to show the
employees were acting outside their scope of employment and that the city had not
waived its immunity~ After briefing and oral:argument, the court ruled in favor of
Defendants and granted their motion for summary on March 30, 2016 (R. 512532). .This appeal is taken from the trial courts final order in the case.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiffs/Appellants Wade and Sandra Winegar ("Winegars") owned a vacant
lot located along Hobble Creek in Springville, Utah. In May of 2005,
Defendants/Appellees, Springville City Corp (the City), Bill Child and Jason
Riding (Child and Riding), without permission or notice, took heavy equipment
across Winegars' lot in order to gain access to Hobble Creek. The City was

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\Ci)

attempting to clear an obstruction further up-stream from Winegars' property and
vJ

wanted to access it via the stream. While there were other access points to enter
the stream and clear the obstruction, Winegars' property appeared to be easier to
access the obstructed section because of work Winegars had done to clean up
debris on their lot and along the stream bank. Because of some trees, the City had
to clear a path down to the creek knocking down some trees in their way. Many of
the trees were mature and had been growing for longer than 30 years (R. 431-455).
The obstruction up stream affected a small 50 foot area two lots above the

~

Winegars lot. The City, through a crew of employees, removed the blockage
further up-stream which was eroding an up-stream bank. Once done and on the
way out of the stream, Child and Riding dug up an island in a protected·water way,
dug up the stream bank to widen it, changed the course of the stream and caused
other damage to the stream bank while widening it and on their way out of the
stream. All of this was done without a required permit from the Utah Division of
Water Resources or u~s. Anny Corp of Engineers. The individuals involved knew

~

they needed a pennit before engaging in such work yet failed to do anything to
obtain one. The pennit would have protected the waterway and provided notice
to property owners of their intended actions. Some of the cut trees were on a
general maintenance easement, but others were on the wooded lot outside of the
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easement The City left the st.ream bank a jumbled mess with logs, rocks and loose
dirt that was almost impassable. The once solid st.ream bank was moved to the
side and now completely tom up and susceptible to erosion when the water level
rises in the spring. It also was no longer usable to walk along. (R. 431-455).
Winegars asked for the names of the city employees involved as their theory
of the case was the violation of Federal and State law by doing what was done in
the st.ream imposed individual liability. The W1negars were told by the City they
needed to submit a notice of claim form to get that information. Winegars went to
the City and were given a claim form specifically to file a claim against the City for
the damage caused. The claim form states on the first line all in caps that
"UNDER STATE LAW, THE CITY HAS 90 DAYS IN WHICH TO
RESPOND TO A CLAIM. IF THE CITY DOES NOT RESPOND WITHIN
90 DAYS, THE CLAIM IS DEEMED DENIED" (R. 377-423, 456-473). It also

states this another time on the second page. Though this language was incorrect
(yet still used by the City until at least September 2012 more than 8 years after the
statutory change), it would become important because the Winegars relied on this
language in understanding when the claim would be deemed denied under state
law. They submitted a notice of claim on January 27, 2006. It is not disputed the
notice of claim was properly served on the City clerk. The City clerk passed on the
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notice of claim to the City attorney to handle. Winegars began communicating
with the City attorney and attempted numerous times to get the names of certain
City employees responsible for the damage to their property so they could include
these individuals in the notice of claim as is required by U.C.A. 63G-7-401(1)(b)(ii).
Springville City declined to provide the names of the employees involved, which
only they knew. Several phone calls and letters were exchanged between the
parties about getting the names of the city employees responsible for the damage.
Springville City's attorney continued to refuse to provide the names and agreed to
t.i9

amend the notice of claim to add "John Does" as the remedy for their not
providing the names (R. 431-455).

vi

During the correspondence with the Springville City attorney, an as-of-then
unidentified third party, URMMA, also began contacting Winegars about the claim.
URMMA, without identifying who they were, stated on March 20, 2006 it would
not make any voluntary payments. The' City latter asserted this n6n-statutory
response from an as-of-then unidentified third party (they w~re not identified until
the reply in the City's first motion for summary judgment) wa~ a denial. Pursuant
to an earlier phone conversation with the City attorney, who had asked that the
request for names be put in writing, Winegars wrote a letter on April 9, 2006
asking for the names of those involved indicating they needed to amend their

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

notice of claim. On April 20, 2006, URMMA responded claiming they would not
provide the information requested of the City and claimed they had earlier denied
the notice of claim. On April 24 2006, Mr. Winegar replied by letter, amending the
notice of claim pursuant to the agreement with the City attorney (amended notice
of claim) in their earlier conversation. In the amended notice of claim, Mr.
Winegar recited the conversation with Springville City's attorney where they agreed
for the need to amend the notice of claim to include this information the city
refused to disclose (R. 377-423, 456-473). This April 24th letter states in part
We [Mr. Winegar and Springville City Attorney] concluded the only
alternative was for me to amend my claim which I submitted to Springville City on
Jaouary 27, 2006 to include the unidentified employees who participated in the
clear cutting of the stream bank, stream bank removal, diversion of the creek and
removal of the trees and timber from the subject property. Based on your refusal
to provide me these names, I hereby amend my claim to include not only
Springville City but all the unidentified employees who participated in any aspect
of the work done at the above listed property, participated in the decision making
to do. such work or carried trees or timber off the ,property.
In that same amended notice of claim letter,.Mr. Winegar also stated:

If you believe I must follow a different process to amend iny claim, please let
me know immediately. I had been waiting for your response for several weeks and
have left numerous phone messages with no response. I will consider the claim
amended with this letter and I am also sending a copy of this to Springville City
through Troy Fitzgerald [City Attorney] as is required by statute. To avoid any
confusion, please let me know if the amended claim is denied as well.
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The URMMA representative, identified only as a claims adjuster, responded to
l.i)

this amended notice of claim rather than the City attorney on May 10, 2006
claiming it was somehow improper or it was denied. Based on the agreed upon
amended notice of claim, Winegars filed suit in Fourth District Court on April 24,
2007.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. The trial court erred when it dismissed the case because Winegars had not
included the names of the individual employees on the notice of claim form and
the amended notice of claim form. The City's refusal to disclose these names,
before the claim was filed and then after numerous requests, forced the Winegars
to amend the notice of claim form (with the City's agreement) and name
"unidentified persons'. The City then later argued the notice of claim and suit
were deficient because claimants failed to timely name the inili:vidual employees
which was one basis for their motion for summary judgement Neither case law
nor honesty, fairness or justice support the City in doing this.
2. The trial court erred when it allowed the City to repudiate its agreement to amend
the notice of claim form with the Winegars, made necessary due to their refusal to
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provide individual names. The claim had been properly commenced under the
GIA by properly serving a notice of claim on the City clerk, who then ~ave the
notice of claim to the city attorney to resolve and a second service on the City
clerk was not required. The notice of claim and its amendment were proper and
gave jurisdiction to the trial court.
3. The trial court should not have allowed the City to misinform claimants of critical
information, such as its written claim and make other misstatements in an effort
to obstruct the claims process and then argue the notice of claim form and
amendment were insufficient. The City should be estopped from relying on these
misstatements in trying to dismiss the case.
4. The should be estopped from seeking dismissal of this matter as their conduct has
violated Rice's holding that "the citizen has a right to expect the same standard of
honesty, justice and fair dealing in his contact with the state or other political
entity, which he is legally accorded in his dealing with other individuals". Citizens
should still expect interactions with governmental entities to follow this standard
set out in Rice. Where the City's conduct rises to the level to obstruct legitimate
claims, they should be estopped from seeking such dismissal.
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5. The trial court should have held the City needed to "strictly comply" with the
vJ

GIA by requiring them to use the simple, statutory language of denying a claim
rather than accepting their "substantial compliance". The City thus introduced
further confusion to claims process by not outright denying the claim, identifying
their insurer and attempting to bootstrap back to a faulty attempted denial. A
governmental entity should meet the same standard of strict compliance with the
GIA as is imposed on claimants. Using language and talcing actions that are
substantially compliant do not meet the burden set out by Utah courts in
following the. GIA by political entities.
6. The trial court held Winegars were required to include "specific allegations" of
"malice or fraud" in the notice of claim form if they were to include individual
employees artd show they acted outside their scope of employment This is not
the standard set out for notice of claim form in the GIA which only requires the
names of the employees and a description of the events, if known. Winegars did
show in the complaint willful misconduct rather than "malice and fraud" when

vJ

employees are alleged to have acted outside the scope of their employment and
the complaint against the individuals should not have been dismissed.

19
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7. The trial court erred by claiming the City's actions were immune from suit under
the floodwater provisions or maintaining a storm system protections of the GIA.
A City's cannot fail to maintain a waterway over time then claim that water is then
eroding the banks and therefore any action they take to remedy it are immune.
This is especially true where the most of the negligent actions took place after the
blockage was cleared. Since many storm drains ultimately are discharged to
Federal and State protected waterways, such an interpretation would void any
permitting requirements by Cities for work done where their storm systems drain.
8. The complaint against Child and Riding was improperly dismissed by the trial
court by stating the notice of claim and amended notice of claim were insufficient .
as to Child and Riding. The notice of claim is not required to have the specificity
of a complaint and requiring a claimant to meet such a high bar is not supported
by statute or case law. Winegars filed a sufficient notice of claim and amended
notice of claim as to the Child and Riding and the trial court should have allowed
the matter to proceed.

ARGUMENT
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VP

In a 1969 case dealing with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act1 ("GIA"), the
Vii>

Utah Supreme Court stated:
The modern trend in both legislative and judicial thinking is toward the concept that
the citizen has a right to expect the same standard of honesty, justice and fair dealing in his
contact with the state or other political entity, which he is legally [23 Utah 2d 26] accorded in
his dealings with other individuals.

Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 162, 23 Utah 2d 22 (Utah 1969). A later
seminal case dealing with the GIA, Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, 40 P.3rd 632, further
interpreted (but did not overrule) Rice holding the court expected strict compliance with the
provisions of the GIA from the parties in regards to the requirements of the GIA. A very
-

recent case addressing the GIA (while still not overruling Rice and_ a citizen's expectations of
honesty, justice and fair dealing) states as to estoppel in regards to the notice provisions of
the GIA:
. . . we have insisted on strict compliance with the terms of the GIA even in the face
of potentially intentional misreprese1_1tations about how to comply with the notice provisions
of the act.
·

Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846, 860 (2016). The
overarching question in this· case is how far can a •City go in what would appear to be a
pattern of intentional obstruction of claimants from pursuing a clairri ·against the City.

1

U.C.A. 63G-7-101 et seq. is the current statute. :Some changes have ,been made to the
statute since 2005 when this matter commenced but most provisions are the same. For ease
of reference, the current statute is used.
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1. The trial court erred when it allowed the City to refuse to provide names of
employees who may be personally liable regarding a claim under the GIA,
both prior to filing of notice of claim and then before the suit is filed, and then
held the notice of claim and suit were deficient because claimants failed to
timely name the individual employees.

In this matter, the City was asked for the names of employees who committed
damage to Winegars' property. The Winegars' theory of the case was the
individuals could be held personally responsible for failing to obtain required
permits, which failure could impose criminal liability. The names were needed to
properly file a notice of claim. Winegars' position was these employees had acted
outside their scope of employment in cutting trees without the owners'
authorization and excavating in a protected waterway and their names needed to
be included on the notice of claim as required by the GIA. But the City refused to
disdose the name of these employees in order to file the notice of claim. Later,
the City argued, and the trial court held, these names should have been included in
the original notice of claim but were not. Winegars assert that since the City
refused to provide them, their only option was to amend _the notice of claim,
which they did with the agreement of the City, on April 24, 2006. This amended
notice of claim contained the best information Winegars had, that 'unidentified
employees' improperly cut trees and damaged the stream without a permit. At a
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minimum, these actions by the City should have tolled the statute of limitations
~

due to their refusal to disclose information needed on the claim form, information
the City clearly had in its possession, and the trial court should have allowed the
matter to proceed without rewarding the City for their obstruction.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA") U.C.A. 63G-7-401(1)(b)

~

requires claimants to exercise reasonable diliger:ice, and prove such, in their
discovering the claim and in identifying the governmental entity or the name of the
employees responsible for the damage. Winegars did all they could without the
cooperation of the Cio/. But for this first refusal by ~e City, ~e_c~aim form would
have been properly submitted on January 27, 2006.

,;}\.
\IS

The City further confused the matter by first agreeing to an amended notice of
claim form then later arguing it is not allow for, by .statute.. If claims could not b
amended as the City now argues, why would they agree to such a thing? While
'

••

t

'

•

'

•

Monarrez comes the closest to questiqning whether citjzens can continue to expect
honesty, justice and fair dealing from governmental entities, it .does not strike this
·,·

)'

concept down and Winegars should be able to ~xpect to interact_ with City in a
honest, fair and jus! manner.
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The trial court should have recognized the Winegars could not have included
the names of the employees for the reasons given. Arguendo, the original claim
form may have not been sufficient without the names, the description of what
took place was accurate. U.C.A. 63G-7-401(1)(b) states:
The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known:
, (i)
That the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its
employee; and

(ii)

The identitr of the governmental entity or the name of the employee.

(Emphasis added).
While the burde~ to establish reasonable diligence falls on the claimant, it is
clear from correspondence between the Winegars and the City that attempts to
discover this information were being vigorously pursued by Winegars and was, in
fact, the purpose of the initial delays and for the amended notice of cl~.
The city should not be rewarded when they fail to cooperate in identifying
employees required to be listed on the notice of claim _or agree to an amended
notice of claim to correct their refusal and then argue against it. At a minimum,
the statute would be tolled for their failure to disclose. The GIA clearly states the
claimant must take reasonable steps to gather this information, which was done.
This inability to. discover the information applies to the City refusing to disclose it.
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There is no benefit to either party in hiding such information, rather than
disclosing and allowing the original notice of claim to proceed without questions
of timeliness or tolling. But the City decided otherwise and refused to disclose the
names. The trial court should not have dismissed the case based on the original
notice of claim not containing the names of the individual. At a minimum, the
statute of limitations should be tolled until the time they provide this needed
information.

2. The trial court erredjn allowing the City to agree to an amended notice of
claim and then later repudiate the agreement by holding such amended notice
of claim is not allowed. ·The claim had been properly commenced under the
GIA by properly se~ng a notice of clai~ on the City Clerk, who then gave the
notice of claim to the city attorney to resolve. The city attorney agreed to
amend the notice of claim to remedy the city's refusal to give individual names
to include on it.
Winegars submittep their original notice of claim on January 27, 2006 and
there is no dispute it was properly served pursuant to the GI)\.. After the notice of
claim was served on the City clerk as required, the City clerk transferred the notice
of claim to the City attorney. Winegars began working with the City attorney and
attempted numerous. times by phone and letter to discover the names of the
individuals responsible for cutting down the trees and disturbing the stream and
steam bank to include in the notice of claim as is required by U.C.A. 63G-7-
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401(1)(b)(ii), without success. On April 9, 2006, Winegars followed up a phone
call to the City's attorney who asked for a written request so they could obtain the
information. Winegars indicated, again, they needed these names to amend their
notice of claim to include the individuals since the City had not disclosed the name
so far.

An as-of-then unidentified entity, URMMA, responded on April 20, 2006
again refusing to provide the names stating this information would need to be
gathered through discovery. On April 24 2006, Winegars responded with an
-arnended notice of claim recognizing it was done with the agreement o( the City
attorney and stating they were adding the names of these unidentified individuals
to comply with Utah Code. Winegars recited the conversation with the City
attorney where both parties recognized the need to amend the notice of claim to
include these unknown names since the City refused to disclose this infonnation.
This April 24th letter states in part
We [Mr. Winegar and Springville City Attorney] concluded the only
alternative was for me to amend my claim which I submitted to Springville
City on January 27, 2006 to include the unidentified ~mployees who
participated in the clear cqtting of the stream bank, stream bank removal,
diversion of the creek and removal of the trees and timber from the subject
property. Based on your refusal to provide me these names, I hereby amend
my claim to include not only Springville City but all the unidentified
employees who participated in any aspect of the work done at the above listed
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viP

property, participated in the decision making to do such work or carried trees
or timber off the property.
In that same amended notice of claim letter, Winegars also stated:
If you believe I must follow a different process to amend my claim, please let
me know immediately. I had been waiting for your response for several weeks
and have left numerous phone messages with no response. I will consider the
claim amended with this letter and I am also sending a copy of this to
Springville City through Troy Fitzgerald [City Attorney] as is required by
statute. To avoid any confusion, please let me know if the amended claim is
denied as well.

URMJv.1.A, still unidentified, responded to this amended notice of claim on
May 10, 2006 claiming it would not qualify as an amended notice of claim since it
was not sent to the right department within the City, rather it was sent to the City's
attorney who had dealt with Winegars since the claim was first properly served on
the City clerk. Further, URMJv.1.A stated that if this letter were an amended notice
of claim, then the City did not think it was liable for any damages they caused.
URMJv.1.A tried to relate the date back to prior a March 20, 2006 correspondence
which stated they would not make any voluntary payments.
Once a notice of claim has been commenced by serving it on the City clerk,
who then gives the case to the city attorney to resolve, practice is the parties work
together to handle the matt~r and have historically been able to rely upon the word
of the other. Amendments and other interactions, after proper service, have been
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mailed to the opposing party unless specifically required by law to be handled in
~

different way. While the City now argues there is no precedent for an amended
notice of claim, why would they agree to such a course if they thought it were
improper or not allowed by statute? The City deals with claims regularly as seen by
their notice of claim form and were clearly on notice of this claim. The purpose of
service is to give notice and to comply with statute, which was properly done.
Mailings between counsel have been acceptable to notify each side of agreed upon
changes after properly initiating service. This is especially so where the need for
the amendment is due to the other party failing to disclose information and done
with their agreement. There is no allegation the City did not receive the amended
notice of claim, as it is referenced in the May 10, 2006 letter from URMMA.
Winegars did strictly comply with U.C.A 63G-7-401(3)(b)(tl) which states the
notice of claim shall be "directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to
~

the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 [mailing requirements] to the office of: (A)
the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or
town; . . . ." This matter was properly comme~ced in accordance with the
UGIA by service to the City clerk who then turned it over to City's attorney. If
the City attorney truly did not believe an amendment would be acceptable, he
should have indicated this rather than agree to an amendment. If the parties are
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trying to resolve matters, there must be some level of trust in each party's
assertions. The evidence the City attorney_ in fact did agree is an uncontested,
contemporaneous letter from Winegars reciting exactly what did happened. The
City does not contest this.
As a matter of first impression, this court can make clear that once an action
has been properly initiated, whether it is administratively _or before the courts,
counsel can agr~e to such actions not addressed in the statute and be able to rely
on those agreements, especially when the City is well versed ~ the claims process
and the other party relies on that The premise stated i1;1 ~cc, that citizens have an
expectation of honesty, justice and fair dealing in their interactions with
government give the parties a basis to reasonably resolve such matters. The trial
court erred when it dismissed the complaint for the stated reason of failing to
strictly comply with the notice of claim requirements of the GIA.

~
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3. The trial court erred by allowing the City to misinform claimants of critical
information, such as its written claim form which informed claimants the
deemed denied period was 90 days rather than 60 days and the City should be
estopped from relying on their misstatements.

~

Even though the GIA was amended in 2004 to change the 'deemed denied'
period from 60 days to 90 days, the City continued to inform claimants, in writing,
the deemed denied period was 90 days. Apparently with knowledge of the error2, the
city continued to misinform claimants on their notice of claim fonn 3 given to
claimants that they had 90 days before the claim would be deemed denied. With this
misinformation, the Winegars worked under the assumption they had 90 days before
~

the claim would be deemed denied if the City did not respond.
During the entire course of the claim, the City frequently introduced
confusion and uncertainty into their dealings with the Winegars. The cumulative
effect of the City's actions is demonstrated in the number of issues on appeal.

2

The City began arguing to the trial court in early 2011 the 'deemed denied' period had
actually changed in 2004 and was now 60 days, not 90 as they had previously asserted. The
fact that the statute had been amended was not contested by the parties. The City also
argued the 60 day period before the Utah Court of Appeals in 2011. Yet at least until
September of 2013, more than 8 years after the statute had changed, the City was still
informing claimants in writing on the notice of claim form the 'deemed denied' period was
90 days.
3 The notice of claim form states in all caps the deemed denied period is 90 days. Also, the
instruction sheet distributed with the claim form also indicates the City has 90 days to
approve or deny the claim or it will be deemed denied.
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A governmental entity should not be able to misinform potential claimants of
critical information in writing, such as the 'deemed denied' period, and then later use
these misunderstandings they introduced into the process to ask the court to dismiss
the case. This would also apply to withholding needed information, agreeing to an
amended notice of claim then repudiating it, misinforming claimants of the 'deem
denied' period or the failure to use the simple, statutory language if they intended to
deny the claim. The stand~d set out in Rice, even as viewed through the leris of
strict compliance with the GIA, still requires government entities to interact with
claimants honestly, fairly and justly. This was not done by the City and they should
not now be allowed to benefit from their misdeeds.
They should be estopped fror:µ claiming the form and argument were both in error
and Winegars should have discovered the -error. A governmental entity should not be
able to misinform potential claimants of certain time limits and then later use this
misunderstanding to ask the court to dismiss the case. Rather they should be
equitably estopped from asserting such a position.
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~

Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 23 Utah 2d 22 (Utah 1969) recognized the
court's power to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in cases dealing with the
GIA. This issue before the court is an important issue as to how far a City can go in
misleading claimants. Clearly they knew this in May of 2011 as their counsel argued it
was changed in 2004.
Through the history of the case, until defendants filed their reply brief to the City's
motion for summary judgment, all the parties were working under the understanding,
though incorrect, based on this notice of claim form, that the (deemed denied' period
.was 90 days. One of the questions before this court is whether the City can continue
to misinform.potential claimants of certain critical time limits a~d then later use this
misunderstanding to ask the court to dismiss a case. Or, should they be equitably
estopped from asserting such a position.
'Where, as here, the delay in commencing action was induced by the conduct
of the party sought to be charged the latter may not invoke such conduct to
defeat recovery. An estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud
on the part of the person sought to be estopped. To create an equitable
estoppe~ 'it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such
means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have
retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.'*** 'It is well settled that
a person by his conduct may be estopped to rely upon these defenses.

Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 162, 23 Utah 2d 22 (Utah 1969) (Rice court
citing Benner v. Industrial Acc. Comm., supra, 26 Cal.2d 346,349, 159 P.2d 24, 26).
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The City continued to misinform claimants as to when the deemed denied period
actually occurred and hence the requirement to file suit within a year of that date.
The City should be estopped from asserting this defense.
~

4.

The trial court erred in not estopping the city from conduct where "the
citizen has a right to expect the same standard of honesty, justice and
fair dealing in his contact with the state or other political entity, which
he is legally accorded in his dealing with other individuals" found in
Rice Y- Granite School Dist., and citizens should still expect interactions
with governmental entities to follow this standard set out in Rice.

As noted above, cases decided after Rice, though not overruling it, focus on
strict compliance with the requirements of the GIA. Winegars argue their actions
did, in fact, strictly complied with the GIA, even in the face of numerous
misrepresentations by the City in an effort to obstruct compliance. A more recent
case interpreting the GIA, Monamz, states:
... we have insisted on strict compliance with the terms of the GIA even in
the face of potentially intentional misrepresentations about how to comply
with the notice provisions of the act
Monarrezat,I37. Wmegars do not believe though thatMonamzallows intentional

misrepresentations to rise to a level where they allow the City to, with apparent
impunity, obstruct claimants to the point they defeat an otherwise valid claim.
These. actions by the City include:
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-repeatedly withholding from claimants simple informatiqn needed to properly
file a claim which then created the need for an amendment;
-for over 8 years misinfonning claimants the 'deemed denied' period was 90
days rather than the statutory 60 days;
-agreeing to an amended notice of claim to fix their withholding of
information then repudiating the agreement;
-not using simple, clear statutory language to deny a claim;
-not identifying their insurer in correspondence with claimants;
-waiting over 4 years to claim non-compliance with notice of claim
requirements;
-assuring claimants proper permits for the work being done were obtained
when they were not;

These actions violate the expectations of honesty, fairness and justice that
citizens should expect from one another and, in accordance with Rice, citizens
should expect from political entities. Where the number and significance of such
actions rise to a level where the City has obstructed compliance, introduced so
much confusion into the claims process, and ultimately argue for summary
judgment based on the results of their action, they should be estopped from
benefitting from their misconduct Monarrez addressed the issue of estoppel as
well, in two cited cases by stating that "estoppel was warranted because there were
"very clear, well-substantiated representations by government entities" that were
directly contradicted by those entities' subsequent actions." Id. at ,r36. This case
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~

now before the court clearly establishes the very clear, well-substantiated
VP

misrepresentations by the City that were later contradicted by the City's actions.
The City also waited for four years to assert this defense of non-compliance
with the GIA notice requirements. While Utah has not addressed this issue, other
jurisdictions have stating such defenses should be filed within a reasonable time
after the filing of the complaint or they are waived. In 45 A.LR.5th 109, citing a
New Jersey case to support the position, the article argues that public entities
should raise the defense of lack of proper ·notice at their "earliest convenience" or
risk waiver of the defense. The New Jersey citation, Hill v. Board ojEducation, 183
N.J. Super 36, 39-41 (NJ 1982) held that a Township waived their right to assert
such a defense, in part, because they filed a motion to dismiss two and a half years
after the complaint was filed. The New Jersey court relied apon the doctrine of
equitable estoppel by stating that "Certainly, defendant's cbnduct created the
objective impression that it was waiving the notice requirements, especially in view
of its failure to properly plead this defense." Hillv. Board ofEducation, 183 N.J.
Super 36, 41 (NJ 1982).
The case at hand goes even further by waiting four years before filing a
motion for summary judgment. This, compounded with the other acts of the City
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have created significant difficulties for daimants and the City should be estopped
from seeking dismissal of the case.
5. The trial court erred in not requiring the.city to "strictly comply" with

the GIA rather than accepting their "substantial compliance" thus
allowing the city to introduce further confusion to claimants attempting
to comply with the GIA.
Governmental entities have the same "strict compliance" standard under the
GIA that claimants have rather than a "substantial compliance" standard the City
now implicitly wants applied to their actions. The requirements of the GIA have
been discuss~~ in numerous U~h ~pp~eµate c<;mrt_ depsJo_r1:s. One signi_fif_ant case
dealing with the GIA and strict co_mpliance, Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, 40
P.3rd 632, addressed a number of issues re~ding the ~IA, including whether the
court would adopt a "substantial compliance" standard, which the court declined
to do. The court did not differentiate between whether the strict compliance
standard applied to claimants only versus the political entity. The Wheeler case
clearly states, and has been used by many litigants, for the proposition that the
requirements of the GIA must be strictly followed.

36
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The UGIA requires a city (or its insurer) specifically state a claim is "denied"
(or it will be deemed denied) ''Within 60 days4 of the filing of a notice of claim,
the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that

the claim has either been approved or denied." (U.C.A. 63G-7-403 (l)(a), (emphasis
added)). The City did not comply with the language of the UGIA in two
important ways.
First, neither the City nor URMMA (it now appears from depositions
URMMA is the City's insurer though this was not made known to Winegars until
the Defendant's Reply in 2011) wrote in their claimed denial letter that the
Winegars' 'claim has been denied.' Instead, URMMA used the vague and nonstatutory language that it will not " ... make any voluntary payments.... " The
not by
City believes it can. accelerate the required filing date of the complaint,
.
~ollowing the very simple statutory language, but by stating it won't make voluntary
(jp

payments. The City presumes it is incumbent on the Winegars to deduce that 'no

4

As mentioned above, the current act was amended to change the deemed denied period to
60 days from 90 days in 2004 and there is no question that the statute in force at the time of
this action was 60 days. The notice of claim form though provided by Springville City and
used by the W1negars in 2006 informed potential claimants this. period was 90 days. This
claim form was still in us·e more than 8 ,years after the statute was amended, still informing
claimants the statutory period when a claim is deemed denied is 90 days.
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~

voluntary payment' means the claim is officially "denied" under the statute, even
though made by an unidentified party.
Secondly, the identity of URMMA was only a guess when the letter was
written, as this court pointed out in the prior appeal. An insurer (or City) has the
obligation to use proper statutory language and to identify itself as the insurer.
The URMMA letter stated it was a Claims Adjuster writing the letter (which is not
necessarily the insurer). Claimants should not be left to guess as to the identity and
role of someone contacting them, apparently on behalf of the City, thus creating
-further confusion. found in. this -case.5--

But more importantly, if the City wants to accelerate the filing date of the
complaint, it must strictly comply with the statute so the Winegars are put on
notice the filing date for civil action has been changed rather than acting in.
substantial compliance with the GIA, which is insufficient on behalf of the
governmental agency under the Wheeler case and attempting to persuade the court
their actions were 'good enough'. The City would have ·this Court apply the
substantial compliance standard to their actions (a stand~d which Wheeler rejected).
5 This

appears to be what the .statute requires rather than the vague language the URMMA
used and later attempts to justify it as being clear. The letter speaks for itself and this court
should detennine whether substantial compliance on behalf of the City is all that is required.
Wheeler indicates a higher standard, from both parties, is expected.
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~

Requiring strict compliance from the City avoids the confusion the statute meant

IJ

to avoid.
It is simple and avoids any confusion for a government agency wanting to

VP

shorten the time to file the complaint by denying the claim before the deemed
denied period, to comply with the statute by using clear, simple statutory language
such as: 'as Springville City's insurer, your claim is hereby denied'. Then no one is
left to guess. But the City failed to do this and now tries to justify their misleading
actions at the expense of the claimant and shorten the period. This is why strict
compliance on their part is required, to avoid. such issues. Just as is expected of
claim.ants.
While the Wheeler case dealt with a plaintiff who failed to strictly comply, the
case made no distinction between plaintiffs and defendants 'strictly complying.'
"Applying this ~e of strict compliance, we have repeatedly denied recourse to

parties that have even slightly diverged from the exactness required by the
Immunity Act" Wheeler,I 12,635, emphasis added. It is evident the City must
~

argue a dual standard, one for claim.ants, and a very different one for governmental
agencies to succeed with this position. Claimants must "strictly comply'' with the
statute, but governmental agencies need only "substantially comply." Throughout
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briefs, -the City has stated or implied that Winegars should have known that
'declining to make voluntary payments' meant 'denied', that UR1VIlv1A was the
City's insurer or tried to clean it up in later letters and that it clearly should have
been presumed by them. The City fails to recognize that their strict compliance
avoids these issues and that looking at the information prospectively, it is not clear.
Governmental entities have the same responsibility to strictly comply with the
GIA that claimants have, especially when compliance is easy, clearly stated in the
statute and simply accomplished.
- -•-. -- - -- ~- Dueto-the City!s failure to-follow-the dear-and--easy--language--of-the-statute, -·
·they introduced further confusion and unneeded complexity in a case where they
had already introduced such confusion. They now seek to benefit from it and this
court should not allow them to benefit from such obstructions and misstatements.
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6. The trial court erred in requiring the Plaintiffs to include "specific

allegations" of "malice or fraud" in the notice of claim form against
individual employees when the GIA only requires the names of the
employees and a description of the events. Further, the GIA allows
Plaintiffs to show willful misconduct rather than "malice and fraud"
when employees are alleged to have acted outside the scope of their
employment.
The GIA states:

3)

lJ;)

(a)

The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i)

a brief statement of the facts;

(ii)

the nature of the claim asserted;

(iii)

the damages incurred by the claimant so far· as they
are known; and

(iv)

if the claim is being pursued against a governmental
employee individually as provided in Subsection:
63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee.

10
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U.C.A. 63G-7-401 (3). There is no requirement in the statute to include in the notice
of claim submission allegations of fraud or alleged misconduct as stated by the trial
court when it dismissed the case. In fact, the very reason the City may have refused
to disclose requested information was an attempt to avoid individuals from being
named. Yet the original notice of claim describes the conduct, even though the
Winegars could not yet state names or specific detail due to the City's withholding
that information. The original notice of claim described the conduct stating:
. . . . They [now known to be Child and Riding] flattened out the brow of the hill
and drove down into the creek. Once in the creek, they took out all the trees along
the bank on one side and ,then cut-the~bank back-anywhere-from 15 to 30 feet from
where it would naturally flow. All of this material was piled on the remaining area of
bank and some of those trees removed as well. They then worked their way up to the
logjam and cleared it.
The crew removed dozens of trees, a few of which a few were 15 inches or more
in diameter. The creek bank, which was once compact, flat and able to resist the
water flow, was turned into a jumble of sand, rocks, tree branches and stumps....
January 27, 2006 Notice of Claim Form. This clearly meets the standard set out in

Peeples v. State of Utah, 100 P.3d 254,257, 2004 UT App 328 (Utah App. 2004), which states:
We find no ambiguity in the Act's "brief statement of the facts" provision and
conclude that the plain language of that provision does not require
specifics. While specific information might well be helpful, it would not be
appropriate for this court to "improve" the statute by reading an additional
element into the legislatively mandated notice requirements. Pursuant to
statute, a claimant complies merely by providing a brief statement of facts
about the claim being made.

Peeples further states:
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Strict compliance is not, however, a one-way street, and a claimant is not
required to do more than the Act clearly requires. Notice need not be given to
any person other than that directed by statute, even if that person's awareness
of the claim might facilitate investigation or settlement; notice provided
exactly one year after an injury arises is just as timely as notice comfortably
provided six months earlier; and so on. All that is required is simple
compliance, and there is no need for a claimant to exceed the Act's
requirements even if such action might more optimally accomplish the
purposes underlying the Act.

Peeples ,I 9, 257.
While Winegars suspected the.City had failed to obtain the proper permits to make
the individuals' conduct legal (see Winegars April 9 and 24, 2006 Letter to City Attorney),
they were assured by the City the proper permits had been obtained. Without these permits,
the conduct of the individuals would violate criminal statutes and likely be outside the scope
of their employment. Yet the information contained in the notice of claim form does strictly
comply with the GIA by providing a simple description of the conduct. The names were
not included because of the City's refusal to disclose them. By requiring more, the trial court
improperly dismissed Winegars complaint. And there is no requirement, even to name
employees individually to demonstrate malice or fraud, especially in the notice of claim.
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7. The trial court erred when it held the city's actions immune from suit

under the GIA. A City's failure to maintain a waterway over time, which
then causes a small section of bank erosion, does not allow the City to
excavate in the waterway and thus ignore State and federal law meant to
protect waterways and claim immunity for managing flood waters or a
storm system. .
The City is not immune from suit for the negligent actions of its employees6, by
merely claiming the waters were flood waters or it was managing its storm water
system, which is exactly what occurred in this matter. Further, if the employees'
actions were outside the scope of their employment as Winegars argue, the
-- - - individuals can. be .held liable-for-their-actions. Simply invoking the term ''floodwaters" or "storm drain system" is insufficient to maintain immunity when the
City's own evidence shows otherwise.
While the upstream blockage on Hobble Creek was causing bank erosion on a
small section of the stream bank, this was due to a large accumulation of logs, tires
and o.ther debris which had built up over time, not floodwaters. When the water
began to go around this blockage and erode the bank, it was due to the blockage, not
excess water from a flood.

6

U.C.A. 63G-7-301(2)(i)
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Further, it was after this blockage had been cleared and the water was flowing
normally that Child and Riding decided to 'enlarge' the stream bed for a wider flow
around a curve in the stream. This is when the island and trees were removed and
the streambank excavated and pushed back. These actions destabilized the stream
bank in this area of the stream which had been solid and compact prior to the
excavation. These actions by the City and the two individuals required a pennit before
they should have been attempted and they were aware of this. The pennit process
allows for the State or the Army Corp of Engineers to review whether the waterway
should be enlarged and what damage the work would do to a protected waterway.
Because the Child and Riding did not want to go through this process, they just did
the work. State and Federal law do not allow Cities or individuals to alter streams
and steam banks because they think the water would flow more smoothly around a
curve and therefore act unilaterally without a pennit Even arguendo, that the
accumulated debris had caused the stream to flow outside its banks, once the blockage
had been removed and the water returned to its course, no further work should have
been done, especially work that would later jeopardize down-stream properties for no
needed reason. Yet that is what occurred.
The facts of this case do not show the City was ~naging flood waters or that
their work in the stream gave them immunity under the GIA from negligent acts. If
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this were the case, Cities would be de facto immune from State and Federal law
enacted to protect streams and bodies of water when storm water runs into streams,
which it most often does. Allowing them to claim all actions in streams as part of the
storm system would make the City immune from any action for damage due to their
negligent acts and avoid any requirement to obtain permits to work in waterways.
8. The complaint against Child and Riding should not have been

.dismissed as the notice of claim and amended notice of claim were
sufficient to include them and maintain the action against them.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Child and Riding claiming a
number of errors. First, the court reasoned the complaint added a-number-claims not
included in the notice of claim. Yet the notice of claim and the amended notice of
claim clearly set out the acts sufficient to give notice to the City and the individuals as
required by the GIA. As discussed above, the notice of claim and its amendment
clearly describe and put the City on notice of what occurred. The sufficiency of these
two notices comply with both Peeples and Yearsley's requirements for specificity for a
notice of claim.
·The conversations with the City a~tomey, the letters, the notice of claim and
amended notice of claim all indicate exactly the information being sought, what had
happened and later included in the amended complaint. There was no change of
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~

theory from the notice of claim to the complaint or indication the individuals would
not be included. The trial court sets an unattainably high bar for what should be
included in the notice of claim considering no discovery had taken place, the City
attorney had assured Winegars the proper permits had been obtained and that the
City refused to disclose names of those involved. If this is the standard required in a
notice of claim7, the GIA becomes useless for citizens seeking redress for damage
done by political entities.
Second, the trial court held the April 24, 2006 amended notice of claim "fails
to· identify the employees and contains no allegations that the employees' acts
constituted malicious or fraudulent misconduct For these reasons the claims against
Child and Riding fail; ...." Ruling Granting the Defendants' Motion for·Summary

~

Judgment and Order of Dismissa~ March 30, 2016, Pg. 13. The inability ofWinegars
to name the employees is addressed above and was clear to the trial court they could
'.

~

not include the names because of the Oty's refusal to provide the information.
Further, the GIA does not require "malicious or fraudulent misconduct." Winegars
addressed the issue to show willful misconduct by demonstrating the employees
violated State and Federal criminal proscriptions for altering a protected waterway.

7 The

trial court cites Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (1990) for the proposition that the
notice of claim requires a high degree of particularity in the notice of claim.
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In the trial court's ruling, it states Winegars do not have a private right of action
pursuant to the criminal provisions of State and Federal water way violations. This is
not in dispute. The reason for demonstrating the criminal misconduct was never to
suggest they could bring a private action but to demonstrate, as is required by GIA 8,
the willful misconduct of employees and that this type of conduct is outside the
scope of their employment. The employees admitted they knew they should have
obtained a permit, they knew their conduct was illegal without it, and the City does
not view illegal conduct as within the scope of employment.
Finally, the-trial-court reviewed-whether-clearing-the---l0g~jam was within-the-s€0pe
of the employees' employment. While this too was done without a permit they knew
they needed, the clearly egregious conduct was what was done after the log jam had
been cleared and Child and Riding were on their way out of the stream. The removal
of the island, enlarging the stream bed and destruction of the stream bank took place

after, for no apparent reason other than the stream would flow better around the
curve. Child and Riding were improperly dismissed, as their conduct was sufficiently
described in the notice of claim, even if they were not known by name. While Child
and Riding were not named, 'unknown individuals' were named and this was included

U.C.A. 63G-7-202(3)(c)(i) waives employee immunity if "the employee acted or failed to
act through fraud or willful misconduct;"

8
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in the amended notice of claim. Further, once the City attorneys incorrect assertion
that proper permits had been obtained was shown to be incorrect and the names of
the employees discovered, the trial court permitted amendment of the complaint to
add this -information.
The trial court should not have dismissed the individuals as Winegars did
strictly comply with the GIA with the information available at the time it was filed
and Winegars did comply with the requirements of the GIA's notice of claim
requirement
vi)

LEGAL CONCLUSION
Winegars urge this court to reverse the trial court's order granting the
City, Child and Riding's motion for summary judgment and remand the case back
to the trial court deeming the trial court to· have jurisdiction in this matter as they
have strictly complied with the requirements of the GIA, as much as was possible
due to the City's obstructive and misrepresentative actions. Winegars ask the court
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to clarify that governmental agencies have a duty to interact with citizens honestly,
fairly and with justice.

ADDENDUM

a. Ruling and order regarding Springville City, Child and Riding's motion for
summary judgment dated March 30, 2016.
b. Notice of Claim submitted to Springville City.
c. Amended Notice oIClaim-(Letter to Springville City).
d. URMMA letter dated March 20, 2006
e. Winegar letter dated April 9, 2006
f. URMMA letter dated April 20, 2006
~

g. Winegar letter dated April 24, 2006
h. URMMA letter dated May 10, 2006
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.,,el.

.

Respectfully submitted, this L day of October, 2016.

'l

Wade Winegar
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of October, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

Dennis C. Ferguson
Timothy J. Bywater
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 E. 200 So. Suite 500
P. 0. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Atto-meys for Defendants1.Appellees
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FILED

MAR:GR.
•TH

STATE
UTAH

T

· IN THE F,O_URTH JUI)ICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

WADE S. WINEGAR and SANDRA
WINEGAR, indivi<l.uals,
·
<.,

RULING GRANTING THE

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR'
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER.OF DISMISSAL .

Plaintiffs,
vs.

SPRINGVILLE CITY, a Municipal .
Corporation of the State of Utah, BILL
CIDLD, an individual, and JASON
RIDING, an individual, . . . .

CASE NO. 070401317
DATE; M~ch 39, 201 _6
Judge Claudia Laycoc~

Defendants.

Division 3

This matter is before_ the court for ruling on the defendants' (Springville City, Bill
'

Child, and Jason Riding) Motion for Summary Judgment. After hearing oral argument, reviewing
the motion and the memoranda and relevant authorities, the court now rules in this matter.
I.

UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. On January 27, 2006 the plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with Springville City (''the
City").

2. The notice of cl~ filed on January 27, 2006 contained no allegations indicating

that the plaintiffs intended to pursue claims against any Springville City employees individually.
v/;

3. In March 2006 (and the other relevant time periods for this case), the City's insurer
was Utah Risk Management Mutual Association ("URMMA"); Lyle Kunz was the adjuster for
v.i

viJ

URMMA who handled the plaintiffs' claim.
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4. On March 20; 2006 Lyle Kunz (~~Kunz~:') wrote {a letter to•,Winegar in which Kunz
.

;

.

·~ .,

.

denied.the notjce <>f ~laim filed on January 27, 2QQ6. Th~ t.'ir$t s~n,t~nce of the letter states, "Our
investigation1n'.to.tli~
claim
.

yo~ have made against Springville City fordmn~ge to your
,.

·:.

·•

.. ·.;

landscaping and property ..• is_ ~<l~ c_omplete.''!The fin~ sentence states, "Because the City
would not be held liable, we must respectfully decline to make any voluntary payments on this
claim." The letter was signed by "LyleKunz, Claims A~j:qst~r..'' ·-.····. · ' ·
.

•

~

•

;.

•'

!

= '.

..

.

5. In his deposition, Winegar stated that he had b~~ .''vio~long: ex~lusively
with
T~oy
.
...
..
:

:

Fitzgerald, and out of the blue got a letter_ from Lyle. Kunz, [He] assumed he was an adjuster."
',.'-

.

'

6-" On April 9, 2006 Winegar did not respond directly to Kunz,-but,. instead, sent.a letter
-

I

- -

t

•

•

•;

~

r

•~_.'

r~

) : :' •

-f •

•

1

!

•

'

to Troy Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald"), the city atto~ey, req~esting additional information so he could
"amend [his] claim prior to the end of April to include these individuals." Winegar explained
that "I need to get the names of all those involved in cutting trees on the subject property on or ·
)•_

',-:

about May 8, 2005. Also, I will need the names of all those involved in the decision-making
process, direction and supervision of this project."
7. On April 20, 2006 Kunz responded to Winegar's April 9, 2006 letter to Fitzgerald
through another letter, which again stated that the notice of claim had been denied on March 20,
2006. Winegar admits that he received Kunz's letter. The letter is as follows:
Your letter dated April 9, 2006, addressed to Mr. Troy Fitzgerald, has
been referred to us for a response.
. .- . .
Your claim was denied on March 20, 2006. We are not prepared to
continue negotiations with you by providing the information you hav~
requested in your letter. If you chose to not accept our denial and if you
chose to move this claim to the next step, your attorney can gather this
information through the discovery process of the court syster. (sic)
2
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lib

8~ In a letter dated April 24,.2006, Winegar responded t<rKunz~s letter from April 20,
2006 and acknowledged that the claim had been "outright" denied~ Because the City had refused
to provide him the names of the individuals involved·in clearing the logjam, he stated~

· l hereby amend my claim· to include not only Springville City, but all the · ·
unidentified employees who participated in any aspect of the work done ...
participated in the decision-making to do such work or carried trees or timber
off the property.
!.If you believe I must follow a different process to·amend my claim, please
let me know immediately.
Winegar sent a copy of the letter to Fitzgerald, as well.
9. Kunz responded to Winegar's April 24, 2006 letter with another letter dated May 10,
2006, in which Kunz warned Winegar that Kunz's ''review of [the] letter indicates that it would
not qualify as an amended Notice of Claim. since it is not directed to the right department within
:,-

'

the City." Kunz also stated that the City would "stand on the original denial which was conveyed
to you in our letter dated March 20, 2006."
10. The plaintiffs initiated thi~ action on April 24, 2007 by filing a complaint (Civil No.
..

t

070401317) in the Provo Department of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, Utah.
11. In May 2005 defendant Jason Riding ("Riding") was employed by the Springville·
City Streets Department.
12. On approximately May 5, 2005 Riding was directed by another city employee, Bill
Child ("Child"), to remove a logjam in Hobble Creek.
13. Riding received instructions from Child to remove the logjam, remove the island,
capture and remove the debris out of the creek, and haul it off and dispo$e of it.

3
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l4. Riding's regularjob responsibilities included walking the creek with Child and his
.crew ev~ry year to look for logjams.
1

15. · In May 200S Bill Child was the City's Superintendent.of Roads•., :
16. As the superintendent, Child was responsible for maintaining ·the City'ststreets, as
well as maintaining watedlow .through-Hobble Creek.,
?

,,,

17. In late April or early May 2005, the City,received a report that· a logja;m was
spotted in Hobble Creek. The report also indicated that run-off water was running high and
portions of the land adjacent to the stream were under water.
18. Child and his crew responded and observed that a logjam was causing the river to
··........

'

back up and that portions of the river bank were falling into the creek.
~

'l

. .

. ;

~

i., .

.

19. Child testified that, in directing his crew to clear the logjam, he was not singling out
.

.

...

~

:

any property in particular, but he was trying to preserve property on the entire north side of the
creek.
20. Springville City Ordinances§ 4-12-101 and§ 4-12-102(15) make Hobble Creek
~

part of the Sp~ngville City Stonn Water Drainage system.
_;

~

' :

.

DISCUSSION
:!

This issues before the court in this motion for swnmary judgment concern the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA'').1 The defendants move for summary judgment on all of

'Governmental Immunity Act ofUtah, Utah Code Ann.§ 630-7-101 et. seq. (2016);
fonnerly found in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-30d-101 et. seq. (2006). Because of subsequent
amendments to this section, the court cites to the 2006 version of the law, as it was in effectduring the relevant time periods at issue.
4
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the plaintiffs' claims. In support of this motion the defendants submit that the plaintiffs failed to
(A) timely injtiate this action; (B) include sufficiei;,.t allegatjons agai,nst the indiyidual city
employees, Jason,Riding and Bill Child, in their notice of claim; (C) timely identify Jason ~ding
and Bill Child_·as defendants; (D) establish that Riding and Child were acting_ outside the. ~urse
and scope of their-employment; and (E) show that the defendants ~ved their immuniiy ~der
the GIA. These five legal arguments and the defendants1' ,opposing argumeµts are addressed in
tum below.

I. Motion for Summary Judgment
~

· A summary judgment movant must show both that there; is no material issue of f~~t .tµtd
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Utah ~_Civ. ;p. 56(c). ~'Where·th~-

,

moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must establis~ each-element of
vJ

his claim in· order to-show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson,
2008 UT 2·'tl 12. "A summary judgment movant, on an issue where the nonmoving party will

bear the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its burden on summary judgment by showing by
WJ

reference to 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and-. admissioll$ on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,' that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Orvis, at ,I 18. "Upon such a showing, whether or not supported by additional
affirmative factual evidence, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who 'may not rest .
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings/ but 'must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orvis, at ,I 18.

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Plaintiffs', Compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act

The defendants assert that all of the plaintiffs' claims should'be dismissed for the
plaintiffs' failure to timely initiate their claim withiti,one year of its denial. The plaintiffs ·
respond; that they amended their-claim, that the defendants did not comply with the GIA when •
they failed to properly deny the plaintiffs' notice of claim, and;that the defendants are estopped
from asserting their defenses under the GIA. ·

The GIA mandates strict compliance for those bringing a claim.2 "Applying this rule of
strict compliance, [courts] have repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slightly
diverged from the exactness required by the-Immunity Act.?' Wheeler v~ McPherson, 40 P.3d
632, f12 (2002). Failure tO'comply with the statute deprives a courtof subject matter·;·
jurisdiction. Id. at ,r 16.
·The GIA requires that a "claimant shall begin the action within one year after the deni~
of the claim or within olie year after the denial period specified· in this chapter has expired." V.tah
Code Ann. § 63-30d-403(2)(b) (2006). · Failure to file a complaint within the statutory_ one-year
period bars any claim arising from• the alleged hann. Id.
The plaintiffs failed to timely file their complaint and initjate this action within one
year in compliance with the GIA. The plaintiffs received their first notice that their claim had
been denied through a letter: dated March 20, 2006, written by the City's insurance adj~er, Lyle

2

"Therefore, in conformity with our long established jurisprudence construing the
statute-and with our recent interpretation of the 1998 amendment in Greene-we reiterate today
that the Immunity Act demands strict compliance with its requirements to allow suit against
governmental entities." Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632, ,r 13 (2002).
6
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~

Kunz. Kunz reiterated· the denial ofdaim in letters dated April 20, 2006 and May 10, 2006,
noting·:in the letters thatthe-original denial had been issued on March 20, 2006. Despite these
three letters the plaintiffs did nof'initiate ;an action until April 24, 2007-more than thirteen
months aftef the·claim,bad origirially, been d~nied on March 20; 2006.
The plaintiffs' failure:to file:tneir·actfon within the one-year statutory time period
deprives this court of subject' matter jurisdfotion; unfortunately; it is fatal to the plaintiffs' case.
Furthermore, the court now has-sufficient undisputed evidence before it to determine that the·
URMMAwas the insurer-of the defendant, Springville City.3 Indeed, ,Winegar acknowledged
that he assumed that:the letter he;reeeived- 0 out of the blue" fromKunzmeant\that Kunz was an
m·surance adjuster. .

L '

,,·,, ..

The·court rejects the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants did not comply with the
GIA. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants failed to properly deny their notice of claim in the
March 20, 2006; letter as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-403 (2006)~ The plaintiffs argue
that the March 20, 2006 letter ''used vague and non-statutory language'~ by stating that the
defendants would not make "voluntary payments.'' The defendants respond that GIA does not
1

require that a denial of a:claim take a specific fonn.
The court concludes that, because the March 20, 2006 letter was sufficiently clear, it
could only be construed as a denial of claim under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-403 (2006). The
letter referenced the plaintiffs' claims against the City, discussed the plaintiffs' alleged damage,
t.j)

3

See Winegar v. Springville City, 2014 UT App 9, 120.
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concluded that the City ,would not ~ liable, and i¢onnea th~ pl$tiffs that tl;t~· Gity d~lined to
make any vqluntary· payments. There is_;no evid~nce be,fore.th.e. co1At ~t the March 20, 2006 .. •
letter was an attempt. to mislead the pl~ntiffs as to the date the claim'.was de.njed. On~ :Ute cl~
was denied on March 20, 2006, itwas-incumbent on th~-pl~tjffsta jnitiate:an acti.on_again,st,the
defendants as required by U~ Code Ann.·§ 63-30d-403(2)(p).(2()()6).

,i;,

.

: Even .if the court were to conclude that:the March 20,-2006 letter ''use,d_ vague ~<tnoµstatutory language,"· the· April 20, 2006. letter cleared uprany·possible ambiguity. ~u.nz wrote, ..
"Your claim was denied on March 20, 2006.' 1 j f there were any doublS about the sta~ of $e
Winegars' clamntgainst the City, this letter.eliminated any such doubts.· Eveµ ha9: the:Winegars
used this later date (April 20, 2006) as the date when the City made its intentiQ11$ cl~ar, the4." law
suit was still filed four days too late. The GIA allows no.·credit or excqses _for, ~.ling late by just a
few days~
The court notes that the notice of claim was filed: with-the City on January 27,-200~~ ·
Under the GIA, even were the court to accept the plaintiffs' argument that the Mar~h 20, 2006.
was not an effective denial of the notice of claim, •the statutory 60-day .period; foi;-_d~emed-denial
ended on March 28, 2006. Any letters sent by the City or the adjuster after. that date yv,ould be
considered superfluous.·UtahCode Ann. §-63-30d-403(1)(b) (2006); .MQnarrez v. UDOT, 2016
UT 10, 'd 16.
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During oral argument the parties agreed that the plaintiffs were not asserting that a 90day denial period applied rather than the statutory period of 60 days.4 However, even ifthis
argument had been considered by the court, the recent Monarrez decision makes it clear that,
were the City's denial of the claim considered vague, then the notice· of claim would be deemed
denied ifnot accepted: by the City within the: 60-day period under the statute.5
The plaintiffs also argue that their April 24, 2006 letter from Wade Winegar to the city
attorney was an amended notice of claim that reset the· deadline for them to .file a complaint The
plaintiffs assert that this letter was an amended notice of claim as it contained sufficiently
specific allegations thatthe· Winegats·intended·to·sue the City's employees.individually for
alleged willful misconduct. Thcfdefendants counter that the April 24, 2006 letter was not
properly' served on the city clerk as required, but was instead served on the city attorney.
~

The April 24, 2006 letter is not an amended notice of claim for three reasons: First,.the
letter was sent to the wrong city department and, thus, failed to comply with Utah Code Ann. §
63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(A) (2006), which requires that a notice of claim be served on the city clerk.

!

~1

I
I

4

In 2004, the GIA, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1, et seq., was rep~ed and replaced with the current
statutory scheme. As a result of the replacement legislation, the previous 90-day deemed denial period was
shortened to 60 days. See Law 2004, c. 267, §17; See also Utah Legislature 2004- SB0SS passed on March 16,
2004 and effective on July 1, 2004. In the early, pre-appeal stage of this case, there was some dispute about the 60day v. 90-day time period. At oral arguments on.this motion, the parties informed the court that this dispute was no
longer an issue.
5

''Thus, a denial occurs either by written notice within sixty days-subsection (l)(a)-or by operation of
law, a deemed denial, if the government does not respond within those sixty days-subsection (I)(b). Because a
claim cannot be denied in both ways, the time to file a lawsuit can be triggered only once." Mona"ez, 2016 UT l 0,
118
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It is undisputed that the April 24, 2006 letter was served on the: city attorney,. Troy ·Fitzgerald-and
not on the city clerk.
Second, the-GIA does not provide for an amendment of claim. Neither the parties nor
the court could find any provision in the GIA which creates or allows -for an amended claim.
Once a claim is denied, the GIA does not allow for an extension.of time to coinply with its notice
and filing requirements.
- - Lastly, there is no evidence before the court that the .defendants •stip'1lated to allow the
plaintiffs to amend their notice of claim or to reset. the statutory. filing requirements of the GIA.
The record shows.thatupon receiving the April;24, 2006 letter, the defen4,ai)ts-again._resp~nde4
by a letter dated May I 0, 2006, notifying the plaintiffs that the purport~d ~enc;ted noti~e of .,.
claim/letter was sent to the wrong department, that it was .not an.am~nded _noti~ _9f claim, an~
that 'the claim had originally been denied on March 20, 2006.

,.

The court also rejects the plaintiffs' argument that the defenc4mts were estopped from
brihging forth defenses under the GIA. As explained in Monarrez, 2016 UT IQ, ,r 35 {internal
~

citations omitted) :
There are three elements to estoppel: "(l) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on
the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission;
statemen~ or act." "[T]he usual rules of estoppel do notapply against" the
·,.
government, however, and "courts must cautious in applying equitable
estoppel against the State." Accordingly, estoppel is applied against the state
only "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of
governmental powers will not be impaired as a result."

be
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The.plaintiffs fail to establish estoppel. Monarrez explains that in-orderto estop the
defendants from "asserting the GIA~ s one-year limitations period· as a defense, there must be a
specific, written representation directly related to that issue such as a statement that [the
plaintiffs] had satisfied the GIA's requirements or that the government would not assert the
defense in· litigation."Jd ,I 37. There is no evidence before the court that the 'City acted
inco~istentl! wi~ its rejection of the claim or otherwise tried mislead the plaintiffs or delay the
initi~tion of their l~wsuit. See Rice v. Granite School Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 162. The court finds
that the defendants notified the plaintiffs on March 20, April 20, and May 10, 2006 that the claim
.. i.

had been denied. Indeed the April 20, 2006 letter went so far as to suggest that the Winegars
:

'..

': :.

.

..

;

"

'

. '.

...

could develop their theories of liability by filing a lawsuit against the City and conducting
discovery. The defendants never made a written statement which was inconsistent with the
d~fenses now asserted. For these reasons the court concludes that the plaintiffs have failed
establish that the defendants are estopped from raising their defenses under the GIA.

Ji

B. Sufficiency of the Notice of Claim as to Riding and Child

The plaintiffs seek to impose liability on two city employees, Riding and Child, by
suing them as individual defendants. However, the GIA provides that an action against a
governmental entity for acts performed during an employee's course and scope of employment is
typically a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-202(3)(a) (2006). In limited
circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action against individual employees where the claim arises
from an employee's fraud or willful misconduct. Utah Code Ann.§ 63-30d-202(3)(c) (2006).

11
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· When a plaintiff intends to name-a government ·employee individually;- ~e plaintiff
must-comply with the notice of claim requirements as set forth in Utah.Code Ann.§·
63-30d-401(3)(a).(2006):

•

r

.

: "The notice of claim ·shall set forth: (i) a brief statement of the facts_; (ii} the nature of
the claim asserted; (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known;
and (iv} if the claim is being.pursued against a governmental employee individually as
provided in Subsection 63-30d-202(3), the name of the employee."
•:

i

.J

·.•

The GIA requires the notice of claim to state "specific allegations of misconduct on the
.

.

.

~

.

part of the prospective defendant.'' Yearsley v. Jensen, et al., 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990).

..

•'

"Under this standard, the contents of the notice of claim must be sufficient to reasonably alert the
governmental entity of the nature of the claim-that the claimant seeks to bring a cause of action
against a government employee personally due to the employee's fraudulent or malicious
•

•

#•'

•

conduct,, Mecham v. Frazier, 193 P.3d 630, 636 (2008) The GIA requires only "enough
specificity in the notice to inform as to the nature of the clam{ so that the defendant ·can appraise
its potential liability." Houghton v. Dep't ofHealth, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860. Thus, in the
instant case the plaintiffs needed to put forth facts in their notice that Child ~d Riding acted
fraudulently or maliciously to hann the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants were "hiding the ball" and refusing to disclose
the names of the City employees. The defendants respond that the plaintiffs were told they could
,

.

pursue these claims through discovery and by filing a lawsuit. The court concludes that the City
was not required to disclose these names in response to a letter from the plaintiffs or that the
defendants' failure to disclose the names would toll the filing requirements under the GIA.

12
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The plaintiffs failed to provide-sufficient information in their notice of claim to
reasonably alert the defendants that the plaintiffs were suing any City employees individually,
and certainly not Child and Riding individually. The notice of claim filed on January 27, 2006
lacks any mention of John Does, or city employees, or other infonnation suggesting that these
individuals would be sue~ ~ersonally, nor does it identify any individual employees ·or contain
':

.·

any allegations that the actions taken by city employees were willful or fraudulent with respect to
the alleged harm to the plaintiffs' property. Similarly, the plaintiffs' purported amended notice of
claim letter from April 24, 2006 fails to identify the employees and contains no allegations that
the employees' acts constituted malicious or fraudulent misconduct. For these reasons the claims
'

~ ~

against Child and Riding fail; the plaintiffs have not complied with Utah Code Ann. §
63-30d-401 (3) (2006).

C. One-Year Statute of Limitations for Amendment as to Riding and Child
The plaintiffs' claims against Child and Riding also fail in that the plaintiffs'
amendment of their complaint added claims not included in the original notice of claim. As
vJ>

explained above, the plaintiffs must comply with the GIA' s notice requirements. The GIA
prohibits the plaintiffs from amending a complaint to include claims not set forth in the notice of
claim. Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1990). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-402 (2006)
provides:
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the person and according to the requirements of Section 63-
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30d-401 within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
.

,.

In this case the plaintiffs failed provide sufficient information in their notice of claim
I;

.

,

that they would be suing Child and Riding individually6 for acting outside the scope of their
employment or by violating state or federal statutes. The notice of claim filed on January 27,

~

;1

2015 makes no mention of any alleged misconduct of any individual city employee and contains
no reference to any possible violation of a state or federal statute. However, the plaintiffs in their
amended complaint now seek to impose liability on Child and Riding for failing to obtain a
pennit from either the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers of the State of Utah or the State Department
of Water rights before cutting trees or altering the streambed. Plaintiffs, Amended Complaint, at
120, 36-37. These claims are untimely as they were not stated in the notice of claim filed on
January 27, 2006 or otherwise within the requisite one-year time period provided in U.C.A. 1953
§ 63-30d-402 (2006).

Because the plaintiffs now seek damages against these individual defendants, they are
required to show malice or fraud on the part of Child and Riding. These are new claims against
new defendants and are not merely an amplification or expansion of existing claims. "The new
allegations are distinctly different and defendants' liability would be altered significantly if relief
was granted on them."Yearsley, 798 P.2d at 1129. These allegations would require additional
evidence, different standards of proof, and additional discovery. The plaintiffs now ask Child and
Riding for treble damages under Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-3 (2006) and even punitive damages

6

0r any other John or Jane Does individually.
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

for alleged wilful·. misconduct.7 As a result, the claims against Riding and Child individually must
be ~smissed, as th~y were not set forth in the plaintiffs' notice of claim; the proposed
amendment of the plaintiffs' notice of claim through the amended. complaint is untimely under

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-402 (2006).
D. Child~s and Riding's Coune and Scope of Employment

The plaintiffs assert that because the City did not obtain a permit to ~lear the logjam, its
employees, Child and Riding, acted.outside of the course and scope ofthe.ir employment. The

GIA provides that a plaintiff's exclusive remedy .is against th~ governmental entity for inJuries
that occur "during the perfonnance of an employee's duties, within the scope of employmen~ or
under color of authority'~ .of their employment Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-202(3)(a) (2006). Thus,
an individual employee becomes liable only when his conduct falls outside of the co~e and

scope of'their employment Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125,-127 (Utah 1994).
Ordinarily, the determination of whether an employee's conduct falls within or outside
the scope of their etnploytnent is question of fact. Clover v. Snowbird Sid Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,
1039-40 ·(Utah 1991 ). However, "[i]n situations where the activity is so clearly within or without
the scope of employment that reasonable minds could not differ, it lies within the prerogative of

~

the trial judge to decide the issue as a matter oflaw." Id.

I

In determining the course and scope of employment, Utah courts have followed the

three relevant criteria identified in Birkner v. Salt Lake Cnty, 771 P.2d at 1056-57.[T]he Birkner
xlJ

7Now 78B-6-1002, Right of action for injuries to trees-Damage.
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court;identified the criteria as: (!}whether the employee's conduct is of the general kind·the
employee is employed to perform; (2) whether the conduct is ·within: the hours1of the employee's
work and the· ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment; and (3) whether the conduct is
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.'.'· Acor v. Salt Lake
City Sek Dist., 2011 UT 8, 'J:'15, 247 P~3d 404, 408:citing Birkner; 7i71.P.2d at-1058.~:

· The undisputed facts demonstrate that Riding's conduct was within'the ~ourse and
scope of his employment. In May 2005, Riding was employed as al~borer in the Springville··City

iJ

Streets Department. His job responsibilities included conducting-annual· inspections of Hobble,·
·Creek and cleaning the creek channel, which he testified he generally. did each, spring. Qn
··'approximately May 4, 2005 Riding arrived at work and was informed tha~ a logjam was causing
Hobble Creek to back up. Riding, along with several pther .city employees, drove to the creek to
investigate. The high water was causing portions of the ,creek bank to collapse fllld Riding and ~e
rest of the crew were instructed to clear the logjam. The undisputed facts de~Qnstrate that

Riding's conduct was (1) the kind he was generally employed to do, (2) that it occurred within
the typical work hours and boundaries of his employment, and (3) tb~t ii w~ motivated by his
employer's interesfin cleaning the creek channel of the logjam.
Child's conduct was also within the course and scope of his.employment. In May 2QOS,
Child was Springville City's Streets Superintendent. His responsibilities included. ensuring that
Hobble Creek was clear and free flowing. Child received a report that a logjam was. obstructing
the creek, so he and his crew responded to investigate. Upon arriving at the creek, Child observed
that the creek was running more like a river_and that a logjam was causing the creek to overflow
16
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~

and wash away portions of the banks. One·ofChild's employees·entered the creek and
successfully cleared the debris. Again, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Child's conduct was
(1) the kind he was generally employed to do with the City> (2) occurred within the typical work
hours and boundaries of his employment with the City and.(3) was motivated.by his-employer's
interest in ·cleaning the creek channel of the log jam. His conduct was not unusual or outrageous,
but routine and motivated not by his personal interest, but.by his employer's interest.,
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Child and Riding were not acting wilfully
or maliciously outside the scope of their employment in an effort to injure $e plam,tiffs. Jne . :
plaintiffs "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but m~__set-f~rth
specific fa:cts showing that there is a·genuine issue for trial." On,is, at 1 18. The plaintiffs have
failed to respond with any evidence that the Riding and Child- were acting ~utsid~ the course and
iJ

scope of their employment. The evidence indicates that they were acting under the direction. of .
the City in managing the waterways and storm· systems. There are no questions offact here upon
which reasonable minds could differ, thereby precluding summaryjudgment.. Th~r~fore,
summary judgment in the defendants' favor is warranted.
The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants' alleged violations of state and federal
laws requiring a permit before cutting trees or altering a streambed show that Child a,nd Riding
acted outside of the course and scope of the employment. The plaintiffs point to Utah Code 78B6-1002, 78B..8-602, 73-3-29, 73-2-27," and the federal Clean Water Act, cited by the plaintiffs as
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33 C.F .R. 404,,as evidence of the defendants violation of state and· federal· laws.1
The-C()urt rejects the plaintiffs' argument that the Cicy's alleged violations of federal
permits and regulations are· evidence of malice.. The plaintiffs fail·to includ~ any authority. in
their amended complaint that would put both the City and the court on notice as, to. ;what
provisions of.federal 'law were violated. Furthennore, the!plaintiffs lack standing·to bring such ,~
claims, and these statutes do.notprovidefor a private citizen's right to sue. For example, Utah ·
Code Ann. 73'--2-27 (2016) imposes criminal penalties for relocating a natural stream without

~

approval from·the state engineer in violation of Utah Code Ann. 73-3-29 (2016) ..The plaintiffs

a

lack standing to :enforce criminal penalty for the violation Utah Code;Ann. 73,.3.29 (2016).~
· !

Therefore~ the plaintiffs' claims mustbe dismissed, because they have failed.to

·

:establish that Child and· Riding· acted outside the scope of their employment They: cannQt be· ,
held liable under the·GIA or under the other cited state and federal statutes.

E. Immunity under the GIA for trespass and management of flood,waters
The defendants also assert that they ·are shielded from suit as to the plaintiffs.'

~

(negligent destruction of property), second (intentional destruction of property), fo'1rt.h (trespassover property), and fifth (trespasg..,..leaving waste) causes of actions. The GIA provides that
government entities' are immune·from torts arising out of or in connectiQn with an intentional

8

33 GFR §404 is not a. valid citation, but rather a section reserved for futme use. See
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/gi'anule/CFR-2012-title33-vol3/CFR-2012-title33-vol3-part404; The
Clean Water Act is cited as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
Compare this with Utah Code Ann.§ 73-1-15(4) (2016) which allows for a civil action
to be brought independent of a criminal action.
9
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trespass. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(b) (2006). Since the City is immune from claims
arising from intentional trespass, the plaintiffs' claims in their first, second, fourth, and fifth
causes of actions fail as matter of law-in that they arise from the defendants' alleged trespass
Gj

and entry onto the plaintiffs' land.
The defendants are also immune from suit for actions: relating to the management of the
City's flood waters and the maintenance and operation ofits storm water system. In their third
(statutory injuries to trees-treble damages) and sixth (destruction of stream bank)causes of
action, ·the plaintiffs allege that the City and its employees destroyed their trees and damaged the
stream bank while clearing the logjam.
The GIA provides immunity for "(m)-the management of flood waters, earthquak~, or·
natural disasters; (n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or stonn systems." Utah Code
Ann.§ 63..;30d-30l(4)(m-n) (2006). Thus, as explained in Barneckv. UDOT, 2015 UT 50, ,I 26, a

governmental entity retains immunity for "injuries caused by its management of flood waterswaters that have escaped a watercourse, by exceeding its bounds and flowing out over adjacent
property." Management of flood waters was then defined by the court as "executive efforts at
planning, organizing, coordinating, or supervising the government's response to such waters." Id
at 132.
In this case the City acted appropriately under the GIA in trying to prevent high flood
waters from causing damage to properties adjacent to the creek. 10 The City received a report that

10

As set forth in Springville City Code§ 4-12-101 and§ 4-12-102(15) Hobble Creek is

part of Springville City's storm water management system.
4i
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a logjam had occluded Hobble Creek and its employees, under the direction of Child, acted
appropriately to clear the logjam from Hobble Creek. These actions were clearly covered by the
subsections .quoted above.
Therefore, all of the defendants retain immunity for these actions as they were acting
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 63-30d-301(4)(m),(n),(q) (2006).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that the defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment be granted and that all.of the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed against
all defendants.

ORDER
1. The court grants the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. The court dismisses all of the plaintiffs' causes of.action in the Amended Complaint
against all of the defendants.
3. Because the defendants have not filed any counterclaims, this constitutes a dismissal
of the entire case.
4. This constitutes a final order in this matter.
Dated this 30th

~,X ~Qf~f~¥,¢p

16
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Case No. 070401317
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ruling was emailed on 30 March 2016 to the
following:
Todd Winegar
Wade S. Winegar
Dennis C. Ferguson
Timothy J. Bywater .

Ji
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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C~pringville City
50 South Main, Springvllle, Utah 84663
Phone: 801--489-2700 Ftt 8D1-489-2709 '

~ NDER STATE LAW~ THE CITY HAS 90 DAYS IN WHICH TO RESPOND TO A CLAIM. IF THE CITY DOES NOT
:p sPOND WITHIN 90 DAYS, THE CLAIM IS DEEMED DENIED.
.
~

.

,ft/

Thi, form lo to be used for claims for damage beleved to be caused by SpringVllla City. Each blank must l:>e tilled out compJetely. If
,g~&il'lt'ormation 60Ught Is not ~ppftcable, mark •NA• In the blank. If addltlonal .space Is needed. tor your reaponie, attach additional
t ets of paper. PLEASE TYPE ~R PRINT IN BLACK INK.
.

a,V-

"; Jl-e.

State:·

u-t~ k Zl :

. ·• ,;

· med Amount of Loss·

~!,ESCRIPTION OF THE l~IDEITT: (Describe the r:narv,er in ~hich th~ losa ~med. If the loss Involves a~ eutr;>moblle accident,
ijstiqw the dlredlon, speed anct point of Impact) If additional space ·is needed please attach a'dditlonal sheets of paper.·

,! S< ~ A~c.k~-~ tl
.

.

i

~

'1
{

i-f.

• ·J,·,:i

-;t

l·i

i---------------------------------------------1

•

."1oesCRIPTION OF THE LOSS: (If avaBable, attach copies of the repair estimates.) If additional space is needed p)ease attadl
;Jadditional sheets of paper.

t s-

e c:

~ Uct c.~ ~ "'--\-

.
·

.
.

.j

j
·1

;i
:f

·{

·1

_____________________________________

__,

;__

·21.11~2001
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___
_
--(
..

,,

WITNESSES TO THE INCIDENT:

Addnss

Name

~
_

£1 J1'••!'C.~V
~IJ!!!!

City, state, Zip

Phone

7..pLLG;., "iJ::ZS:Sa,

_ ___ ~.!

.

.

Was the loss/acddent Investigated by. any law enforcement agency?_ Yes

Ji No

If yes, which agency? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
i
l
i

If available, attach a copy of the Investigating offleet's report.
Is this lass covered try Insurance? _Yes

f

.,A No

If yes. Insurance Com_paniesName: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Policy#: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If damage to real property, owner ofthe9t0perty:

·WA J-L

Has the damage been appraised or repaJra estimated?

Bc"-1:f:

""".J

_b Yes _

lfyes,bywhom?
Lt;, kl4£C4A«"«tA I
(Please·atlach a copy of 1he estimate.)
r· ,J I

5'-t,4\~p.. lA],'v\~Q:, V

!f
;,

;:

t

No

5-tw&,i\... -r;.~.s

r
, I certify under penarty af perjury, that.the foregoing statements are true to the be$l of my knowledge end belief. I understand~~filing of a materiaDy false statement may ct>nstltute fraud and subject ma to c:rtmlml proBecutlon.

f

Date: :1.'::f- 3°"4blJP-4 2,.00(., Signed:
STATE OF UTAH

.

~

'

}

)ss•

COUNlYOFUTAH}
On the

J. ':J-k','-"

.j";

day o f t : ( IA.lJO..Vl:(

P![S.P.n8Uy appeared before me and, being by me duly sworn, did say the foregoing staternerits are true to the best of his/her
knowledge and belief.
NOTARY PUBLIC residing In

L:=I ~

My commission e x p i r e s ~ - 0 7
NotarySgnatu~

u

.

Augu$12DO\
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'

t·

Attachment I to SpringviUe City Notice of Caim Form

Description of the Incident and bids:

It appears there was a significant logfam on Hobblecreek about 150-200 yards upstream
from the subject property. This Is a new subdivision just west of 1700 Bast before it
crosses over to Mapleton. Apparently, someone called the city and asked tbal this logjam
be cleared out to prevent bank erosion further upstream. TJJjs logjam did not affect our
property at all We had spent well over 100 ~hours clearing the stream banb on our
property t.o iDSUre there would not be a problem with high water. We bad accumulated a
woodpile about 20 feet Jong, 10 feet wide and 8 feet high and had ammgements made-to
h.ave this taken off the property.
On May 4 111, 2005 Springville City Roads Department came down to this area of the
stream to clear the logjam with a tra,;k hoc. The subject Jot had the easiest access to get
intQ the creek so they cleared trees off the btow of the hill to access the creek below.

creek.

They flattened out the brow of the hill and drove down into the
Once· in the creek,
they took out all the trees along the bank on one side and then cot the bank bau:k ·
anywhere-from 15 to 30 feet from where it wonld naturally flow. All of this material was
piled on the mnaining area of bank and sdme of those-trees removed as weJJ. They then
worked their My up to the logjam and cleared it.
The crew removed d ~ of trees, a few of which.a-few were 15 inch~ or more in
diameter. The creek bank. which was once compact. flat and able to resist the water
flow, was turned into ajumble of sand, rocks, tree branches and stuinps. This section of
the stream behind the subject lot was the only secdon that had been cleaned in this area of
HobbJecreek. · While the water was at its high point, it came up o.n the bank but cleanly
flowed through this area without problem. One of the main reasons the Jot was purchased
in August of 2004 wu because of the bcautifuJ, natural stream bank area. We had
cleared a natural amphitheater on the bank and planned to use this area. This entire area
has now been· completely destr0yed. We obtained. three different bids to repair the
damap anc1·pn;tect the now lowered stream bank. One bid ftom Bratt LandsC?Bping
covers the·cost to re-contour the bank to its original ~bape. It does not cover the costs to
haul off debris or to put in new material. The second bid from Bratt landscaping covers
the cost of putting rocks In so n~w soil can be· place in this area and be protected from the
water. The final bid from Seven Trees Is ftom a certified atborist which values tile trees
that were destroyed and mo cost to rcplace them as best as can be done. Many were 30
plus years old and are ineplaceablo. This bid is based on satellite photos of the area.
testil'llOny from witnesse, and ~omparisons with the opposite bank, which would be
similar to the property in question prior to the damage.

\j
.

'
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Wade S. Winegar
2022 East 725 South
Springville, ~tab 84663
Phone 801.420.8900
April 24, 2006

Mr. Lyle Kunz
URMMA
502 East 770 North
Orem. Utah 84097

Mr. Troy Fitzgerald
Springville City

50 South Main St.
Springvill~ Utah 84663

Re: Property claim for 1142 Brookwood Drive, Springville, Utah

Gentlemen:

·I

I received Lyle Kunz' letter dated April 20, 2006. He states he is not prepared to
continue negotiations with me by providing ~e information I requested. Given his stance
and outright denial of the claim, I wa_,m't aware we were in negotiations. Regardless, as I
explained to Troy Fitzgerald. I requested the names of the individuals involved because
Utah Code Annotated §63-30d-401(3)(a)(iv) requires me to state the employees names on
the claim itself if my claim could be pursued against them individually, which I believe
Utah Code permits. I do not have their names and other than obtaining them from one of
you, I have no way to get their names. Clearly, each of you have this information.
,,

In our conversation on April 7, Troy Fitzgerald and I discussed what would happen if
these names were not provided. We concluded the only alternative was for me to amend
my claim which I submitted to Springville City on January 27, 2006 to include the
unidentified employees who participated in the clear cutting of the stream bank, stream
bank removal, diversion of the creek and removal of trees and timber from the subject
property. Based on your refusal to provide me these names, I hereby amend my claim to
include not only Springville City but all the unidentified employees who participated in
any aspect of the work done at the above listed property, participated in the decisionmaking to do such work or carried trees or timber off the property.

If you believe I must follow a different process to amend my claim, please let me know
immediately. I had been waiting for your response for several weeks an8i4.lil\lED
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numerous phone messages with no response. I will consider the claim amended with this
letter and I am also sending a copy of this to Springville City through Troy Fitzgerald as
is required by statute. To avoid any confusion, please let me know if the amended claim
is denied as well.

/

If you have any questi~ns, let me lmow.

~

I

Wade S. W i n e g a r ~

~
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March 20, 2006

Mr. Wade Winegar
2022 East 725 South
Springville, UT 84663
RE: Wade Winegar- Springville

Dear Mr. Winegar:
Our investigation into the claim you have made against Springville City for damage to your landscaping
and property located at 1142 Brookwood Drive is now complete.
·
Our investigation indicates that Springville City would not be held legally liable for any damages you may
_have sustained. ·The City has an easement on the property which allows them to enter the creek bed.
They also have authority to take measures to clean out and maintain the creek bed to prev~nt flooding that
might damage other property downstream.
Because the City would not be held liable, we must respectfully decline to make any voluntary payments
on this claim.
Sincerely, .

!±z~
Claims Adjuster

cc

Troy Fitzgerald, Springville City Attorney
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Wade S. Winegar
2022 East 725 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Phone 801.420.8900

April 9, 2006
Mr. Troy Fitzgerald

Springville City Attorney
SO South Main
Springville, Utah 84663

Re: Property claim for 1142 South Brookwood Drive
Dear Troy:
Thank you for speaking with me. on Friday. Pursuant to our phone conversation, you
asked me to request in writing infonnation I needed. I need to get the names of all those
involved in cutting trees on the subject property on or about May 8, 2005. Also, I will
need the names of all those involved in the decision-making process, direction and
supervision of this project. You also meotioµed there was a photo taken in that time
frame as well and mentioned you may be able to provide that. Fmally, we discussed
whether the State Department of Water Resources had been contacted. You felt
confident that they had been contacted but did not have any particulars as to whether a
pennit had been obtained or whether any form of authorization had been obtained. If you
have by further information on this, please let me know.
You mentioned you were not sure if this request needed to be processed under ORAMA
or how it best be handled.. The reason I need these names is to amend my claim prior to
the end of April to include these individuals. If you have any questions, please let me ·
know.

Regards.

Wade S. Winegar

t
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April 20, 2006

Wade S. Winegar
2022 East 725 South
Springville, UT 84663
RE: Wade Winegar - Springville

Dear Mr. Winegar:
Your letter dated April 9, 2006, addressed to Mr. Troy Fitzgerad, has been referred to us for a response
Your claim was denied on March 20, 2006. We are not prepared to continue negotiations with you by
providing the inform.ation you have requested in your letter. If you chose to not accept our denial and if
you chose to move this claim to the next step, your attorney can gather this information through the
discovery process of the court syster.
Sincerely,

~nz~
Claims Adjuster
cc

Troy Fitzgerald - Springville City Attorney
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Wade S. Winegar

2022 East 725 South
Springville, Qtab 84663
Phone 801.420.8900
April 24, 2006
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Mr. Lyle Kunz
URMMA
S02 Bast 770 North
Orem. Utah 84097
Mr. Troy Fitzgerald
Springville CitySO South Main St.
Springville_ Utah 84663

Re: Property .claim for 1142 Brookwood Drive, Springville, Utah

Gentlemen:
41b

0J

I received Lyle Kunz' letter dated April 20, 2006. He states he is not prepared to
continue negotiations with me by providing ~e information I requested. Given his stance
and outright denial of the claim, I w~'t aware we were in negotiations. Regmlless, as I
explained to Troy Fitzgerald, I requested the names of the individuals involved because
Utah Code Annotated §63-30d-401(3)(a)(iv) requires me to state the employees names on
the claim itself if my claim could be pursued against them individually, which I believe
Utah Code permits. I do not have their names and other than obtaining them ftom one of
you, I have no way to get their names. Clearly, each of you have this information.

·

~

In our conversation on April 7, Troy Fitzgerald and I discussed what would happen if
these names were not provided. We concluded the only alternative was for me to amend

my claim which I submitted to Springville City on January 27, 2006 to include the
unidentified employees wbo participated in the clear cutting of the stream bank, stream
bank removal, diversion of the creek and removal of trees and timber from the subject
property. Based on your refusal ~ provide me these ~es, I hereby amend my claim to
include not only Springville City but all the unidentified employees who participated in
any aspect of the work done at the above listed property, participated in the decisionmaking to do such work or carried trees or timber off the property.

!(you believe I must follow a different process to amend my claim, pleaa,.mtP.!e tno~
immediately. I bad been waiting for your response for several weeks ancHIN.&lVED
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/
numerous phone messages with no response. I will consider the claim amended with this
letter and I am also sending a copy of this to Springville City through Troy Fitzgerald as
is required by statute. To avoid any confusion, please let me know if the amended claim
is denied as well.

If you have any questi~ns, let me know.

~
Wade S. Winegar
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May 10, 2006

1

j
Mr. Wade S. Winegar

•

2022 E. 725 S.
Springville, UT 84663
Re: · Wade Winegar - Springville City
Dear Mr. Winegar:
Thank you for your letter of April 24, 2006. Areview of this letter indicates that it would not qualify as an
amended _Notice of Claim since it is not directed to the right department within the City.
Even if it did qualify as an amended Notice of Claim, we do not believe that there is any significant
additional ifjfonTiation that would cause us to change our decision on the City's liabilify. We must therefore
stand on the original denial which was conveyed to you in our letter dated Marc_
h 20, 2006.
Sincerely,

~~

Lyle Kunz
Claims Adjuster

•

cc:

Troy Fitzgerald, Springville City Attorney
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